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Abstract 
This thesis presents the two hypotheses that airlines use their frequent flyer programmes 
(FFPs) to introduce switching costs to combat competition by increasing the percent discount 
of the value of the points their FFP members receive, and that they use their FFPs to support 
price discrimination by offering business travellers more value for their travel choices. 
Economic theory to support these hypotheses is offered and real life data is collected for a 
number of routes from five major European airlines. The percent discount and value received 
by frequent flyers is regressed on price, competition level, and other relevant variables to 
determine their predictive strength and interdependence. The results and following analysis 
confirm the hypothesis that airlines use their FFPs to support price discrimination since there 
is a strong connection between the price passengers pay and the value of the points they 
receive. The hypothesis that airlines use their FFPs to introduce switching costs when facing 
competition is only partially confirmed since only two airlines increase the percent discount 
they offer their FFP members when competition is high. The remaining three airlines instead 
lower the percent discount as they face increased competition. To accurately determine the 
reason for this difference, more detailed analysis is required. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 History of customer loyalty programmes and frequent flyer 
programmes 
Modern customer loyalty programmes started with Raleigh cigarette coupons and stamp-
based programmes, and according to Berman (2006) the first frequent flyer programme (FFP), 
AAdvantage, was created by American Airlines in 1981. The first FFPs were designed to 
maintain customer loyalty and are based on Klemperer’s (1995) findings that customers will 
stay loyal if the switching of supplier involves high costs. Instead of continuously fighting for 
market share, the airlines realised that if they focused their marketing efforts on those 
passengers who have the ability to make repeat purchases and become ‘lifelong customers’, 
they could save on their cost of marketing while at the same time create a solid base of loyal 
customers (Whyte 2004). 
As Klophaus (2005) points out, FFPs are now a standard product which is offered by most 
established airline carriers. Notable exceptions are European low-cost carriers such as Ryanair 
and easyJet who focus their entire strategies on offering no-frills flights at the lowest possible 
prices. But the total number of FFP members seems to be steadily rising since one passenger 
survey indicated that there where a total of 18 million FFP members in 1988 (Hu et al. 1988) 
while another mentions that the total number was 32 million in 1997 (Arnesen et al. 1997). In 
2006 there were over 130 airlines with a FFP and 163 million people who collected customer 
loyalty points, or ‘miles’ (Berman 2006).  
1.2 Purpose, method, and limitations of the investigation 
Frequent flyer programmes have developed from simple schemes, with coupons for free flight 
awards, to become very complex tools for airlines to increase revenue and help them grow 
their profits. Apart from offering free trips, they now offer a number of additional perks and 
convenient advantages which range from lounge access to additional baggage allowance and 
the possibility to also earn points with a number of ‘partner businesses’. Airlines naturally 
offer passengers these additional advantages with the expectation that their customers will 
become loyal repeat customers. To understand how, and why customers would not choose to 
collect the frequent flyer points of a competing airline in the future instead, we need to 
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familiarise ourselves with switching costs. Since the rewards are not immediately available, 
but take a considerable amount of time and travel to achieve, a customer would ‘reset’ his 
balance of points and wait a longer time until receiving a free trip as a reward if he chooses to 
travel with a competing airline. This cost of switching supplier is known as a switching cost 
and there are a number of different types as identified and categorised by Klemperer (1995) 
and Burnham et al. (2003). But the most easily recognised and valuable of switching costs are 
financial switching costs, such as not receiving free air travel. These switching costs are 
artificially constructed through the FFPs and are expected to reduce the competition between 
aircarriers since they constitute barriers of movement to the passengers. 
Another aim of the FFPs is to increase the value, direct or indirect, which is received by 
passengers who select higher margin products and generate more revenue and higher profits 
for the airlines. While rewards are not immediately available, they can more quickly be 
achieved with additional purchases or by purchasing higher priced products such as business 
class tickets. These possibilities are particularly attractive to business travellers who travel 
frequently and themselves do not have to pay for the additional cost of extra travel or higher 
priced business class tickets. They form part of a group of price insensitive customers which 
airlines, regardless who pays the ticket, wishes to single out and identify. Since airlines 
themselves cannot determine who the price insensitive customers are and who will help them 
increase their profits, they let the customers categorise themselves through a process known 
as price discrimination. By offering a higher quality product which offers the customers more 
value, the airlines can expect the price insensitive customers over a certain preference level to 
select it instead of the lower quality product with less value. In this process, the FFPs are 
expected to play an important role since they provide the airlines with an opportunity to offer 
the price insensitive customers more value (more points) for the purchases they select.  
This paper aims to investigate how FFPs affect switching costs and thereby competition and 
how FFPs are used as a tool to facilitate price discrimination. The following two hypotheses 
are presented: 
Hypothesis 1: Airlines will in the presence of competition use their FFPs to 
increase the percent discount of the value of points passengers 
receive in order to avoid lowering their prices. 
Hypothesis 2:  Airlines can support price discrimination by offering business 
travellers more value for their travel choice through their FFP. 
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These hypotheses will be investigated by the collection of actual data on prices, competition 
level and reward level for five major European airlines and their FFPs. Through multiple 
regression, connections between the selected variables and the value they offer the passengers 
for their travel choice will be investigated and compared to the hypotheses to see if they may 
be supported or not. With the exception of a smaller analysis of the status levels of the FFPs 
and their impact on switching costs and price discrimination, this paper will limit its focus 
entirely on the travel awards the FFPs offer their frequent travellers. 
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2 Frequent flyer programmes in practice 
2.1 Different types of customer loyalty programmes 
There is a variety of different customer loyalty programmes, but the best description and 
categorisation has been presented by Berman (2006) who describes four different types of 
loyalty programmes described in Table 1. 
Berman does not consider Type 1 to be a true loyalty programme since it is open to all 
customers and gives the same discount with no consideration to the customers purchase 
history. Further, these types of programmes do not reward loyalty or encourage repeat 
purchases. The Type 1 programme simply rewards membership and is typically employed by 
smaller companies with smaller resources. The loyalty programme Types 2, 3 and 4 offer 
rebates, free goods or discounts related to customer’s purchase with the aim to increase the 
customer’s number of total purchases. 
Programme type Characteristics of programme Example 
Type 1: 
Members receive 
additional discount 
at register 
• Membership open to all customers 
• Clerk will swipe discount card if member forgets or does 
not have card 
• Each member receives the same discount regardless of 
purchase history 
• Firm has no information base on customer name, 
demographics, or purchase history 
• There is no targeted communications directed at 
members 
Supermarket 
programmes 
Type 2: 
Members receive 1 
free when they 
purchase n units 
• Membership open to all customers 
• Firm does not maintain a customer database linking 
purchases to specific customers 
Local car wash, nail 
salon, hairdressers, 
airport car parks 
Type 3: 
Members receive 
rebates on points 
based on cumulative 
purchases 
• Seeks to get members to spend enough to receive 
qualifying discount 
Airlines, hotels, credit 
card companies 
Type 4: 
Members receive 
targeted offers and 
mailings 
• Members are divided into segments based on their 
purchase history 
• Requires a comprehensive customer database of 
customer demographics and purchase history 
Very large retail chains 
Table 1: Different types of customer loyalty programmes 
A Type 2 programme offers a quantity discount where members get a free unit after having 
bought a certain number of units. This type of programme is easy to administer and often used 
by smaller retailers with smaller resources. Type 3 programmes typically have a point system 
where the discounts or awards are related to the number of points gathered. This way, 
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consumers are encouraged to buy more and make bigger purchases. Type 3 programmes often 
involve different partner companies who offer complementary goods or services (such as 
airlines and hotels) and thereby further encourage customers to collect more points. This type 
of programme requires quite a bit of resources and is often employed by larger corporations 
such as airlines, hotel chains and credit card companies. But with a Type 3 programme, 
customers should not be able to earn more points through partner companies than through the 
main company of the loyalty programme. For a FFP, Klophaus (2005) finds that “non-airline 
partners may erode the specific carrier loyalty effect if frequent flyers can accrue miles faster 
through them”. A Type 4 programme works in the same way as a Type 3 programme, but is 
much more advanced in the way that it involves extensive data hoarding which is aimed at 
predicting the customer’s future purchases. By using the data of past purchases, merchants 
with Type 4 programmes send targeted offers to their members. The purpose of these targeted 
offers is to improve the probability that the customer increases his purchases by sending him 
the offers which are most likely to appeal to him. A Type 4 programme requires big resources 
and extensive data storage and is commonly used by dedicated merchants such as large retail 
corporations. Since published by Berman in 2006, it is however presumed that the FFPs of 
airlines have developed into Type 4 programmes based on the amount of passenger data 
which is available to them and the reduced cost of data storage. 
Every time a member of a Type 3 or Type 4 programme uses his membership in association 
with a purchase, the merchant registers the information in his database and uses this 
information for anything from pricing, inventory management or promotion planning. The 
database also allows for the merchant to evaluate the results of promotions, the use of new 
sales channels and advertising effects. Since all the customer has to do is to swipe his or her 
card, the reported data is accurate as opposed to self-reported data from market studies and 
quickly builds very large samples of true transactional data. 
Providers of Type 3 and Type 4 programmes can lower the costs for their programmes by 
partnering with other companies or creating coalition loyalty programmes such as airline 
alliances. By sharing their data, the companies can not only share costs but also access each 
other’s data to find cross-selling opportunities. Apart from airlines, other popular loyalty 
programme partnerships include companies in the travel, fuel and financial services 
industries. 
Effective Type 3 or Type 4 loyalty programmes are commonly run by cross-functional 
organisations which are wholly dedicated to the management of the programme. Tesco’s 
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Clubcard is said to employ 500 people who work in their call-centres, in marketing, 
accounting and store operations and loss prevention functions (Berman 2006). Also in the 
airline industry, customer loyalty programmes are run by dedicated teams and many of them 
are even organised as separate company entities. For example, the Lufthansa Group’s FFP is 
organised under a company called Miles & More GmbH, British Airway’s FFP is organised 
under a company called Avios Group Limited (AGL), and Air Berlin’s FFP is organised 
under a company called Topbonus Ltd. and located in the UK. 
Klophaus (2005) points out that after Southwest Airlines pioneered the concept of being a no-
frills low-cost airline (LCA), the model was quickly adopted by several European carriers, 
most notably Ryanair and easyJet. By March 2005, still only 20% of these European LCAs 
had FFPs or other loyalty schemes and several reasons are mentioned for them to not yet offer 
FFPs. Among the reasons are the limited numbers and lack of partners, the strong market 
growth, the strong focus on costs and pressure on prices. But he still argues that “for LCAs 
with no prospect of becoming one of the cost leaders, however, the pressure on prices is not 
an argument against introducing selected frills, but in some context a reason favouring it.” 
Klophaus  refers to a ‘winner-takes-all’ effect where only the market leading LCAs in Europe 
and North America have continuous high profits and suggests that the answer to the other 
LCAs could lie in introducing more basic customer loyalty programmes which he calls ‘FFP 
light’. As an example, he mentions JetBlue and Southwest Airlines who have created FFPs 
which are significantly cheaper to administer and makes it easier for customers to predict their 
rewards. Instead of a more complex mileage or points system, Southwest Airlines’ FFP 
awards one credit for each flight taken and rewards its frequent flyers with an award once the 
member has reached 16 credits. Reward flights are issued automatically and are transferable 
to friends and relatives and can be used on any flight where there are still available places. 
Although this scheme was rewarded with the Freddie Award for best American FFP in 2001, 
no European airline has yet implemented this type of ‘FFP light’. Instead, the cost-cutting 
race has continued and led to a number of bankruptcies while others have introduced or 
expanded their FFPs. Examples include Air Berlin who has joined the Oneworld alliance and 
Germanwings who has been developed to be Lufthansa’s European low-cost alternative which 
serves all routes not to or from the hubs of Frankfurt or Munich. Germanwings now has its 
own FFP called the ‘Boomerang Club’, but members of the Lufthansa Group’s FFP, Miles & 
More, can still also collect points on Germanwings flights. 
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Terblanche (2014) finds that the benefits which FFP members perceive are industry specific 
and points out that managers should be familiar with the expectations of programme 
members. He suggests that managers ask if the additional benefits which a higher status level 
offers meets customers’ expectations and is of sufficient value to customers for them to strive 
to obtain it or if they think that more benefits or status levels are necessary.  
2.2 Additional FFP benefits offered to frequent flyers  
Terblanche (2014) used previous research to group customer perceived FFP benefits into 
seven groups consisting of monetary savings, exploration1, entertainment, recognition, social 
status, convenience and preferential treatment. 
But this type of grouping does not very clearly categorise FFP benefits as an example easily 
demonstrates. Access to lounges may be considered to provide elements of all these 
categories since it apart from convenience offers both recognition and social status through 
preferential treatment. Most lounges also offer newspapers, drinks and lighter or even full 
meals which present monetary savings to the travelling businessman. 
An alternative view on the additional FFP benefits is presented by Whyte (2004) who in a 
survey  identified 25 different FFP benefits apart from ‘free flights’ and clustered them into 8 
key benefits which are listed in Table 2 according to their ranking by passengers. 
1 Lounge 
2 Preferred seating 
3 Priority check-in 
4 Occasional upgrades 
5 Priority baggage 
6 Increased baggage allowance 
7 Partner benefits (alliances/hotels/car rentals) 
8 Booking service 
Table 2: Whyte’s (2004) ranking of additional FFP benefits 
                                                 
1
 From permitting customers to visit and experience exceptional places which they would not have visited if it 
was not for the frequent flyer programme. 
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Most FFPs offer additional benefits such as listed in Whyte’s (2004) ranking, but the extent 
and availability depends on the status level of the frequent flyer and is an additional way in 
which airlines try to differentiate themselves compared to competition. 
2.3 FFPs and ethical concerns 
FFPs present a number of ethical problems since it is often the employee who selects the 
airline while it is the employer who pays for the flight. A problem commonly referred to as 
the principal-agent problem. Deane (1988) highlights four main ethical problems which 
should be considered. 
1. Inefficiency in selecting travel services 
• There is a risk that an employee selects a less efficient route or more costly 
service so he can accumulate more points with his preferred carrier. This leads 
to higher costs and lower employee efficiency for the employer. 
2. Price subsidies 
• While it is clear that frequent flyers have to pay higher ticket prices to finance 
the rewards, this is also true for non-business and non-frequent flyers. The 
costs of the rewards need to be covered somehow and with ticket prices being 
the same, this means that one group of travellers is subsidising reward travel 
for another group. 
3. Promotes the evasion of income tax 
• A free reward trip which is the result of company paid travel equals an 
additional income which is taxable. But the procedures of FFPs do not allow 
for easy tracking and therefore promotes underground economy. 
4. Distorts competitive forces 
• FFPs distorts competition since smaller airlines don’t have the possibility to 
offer reward trips to as many and maybe exotic locations as larger airlines. 
To alter the ethical issues regarding FFPs, Deane suggests a practical resolution of tax issues 
by the IRS (U.S. taxation authority) and corporate flyer accounts. 
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Chin (2002) refers to a source in which airline marketing officials claim that FFPs increase 
their business with 20-35% but points out that it is highly improbable since it would mean that 
business travellers would take unnecessary trips for billions of USD every year. Unnecessary 
use of business trips, or unnecessarily expensive business trips, may occur if the business 
traveller himself arranges the travel and gets to claim the accumulated points privately. And 
apparently, unnecessary flights or additional layovers to gain miles in order to achieve a 
higher status level is still a common enough phenomenon to be known as a ‘mileage run’ in 
online FFP forums such as flyertalk.com. 
According to a study of 204 corporations, Hu et al. (1988) found that most companies 
mentioned more expensive fare choices as being their main problem regarding FFP abuse 
(57%) with other big FFP abuse problems being unnecessary travel (16%) and wasted 
employee time (14%). Deane (1988) conducted a study of 625 airline passengers where 95% 
of the business traveller respondents reported that they received the miles for travel paid for 
by their employer. 25% of the respondents admitted to having taken trips that were 
unnecessary so they could accumulate more points. And while 80% of the business travellers 
admitted that their FFP membership influenced their choice of airline, only 25% saw it as an 
ethical problem. This is in stark contrast to the non-frequent flyer respondents of which 50% 
agreed that FFPs present ethical problems. Later, the study of Arnesen et al. (1997) which 
included 506 corporate travel managers, found that 70% of the companies complained of 
additional costs due to unnecessary business travel by their employees. The total additional 
cost of unnecessary business travel was estimated to be 8% of corporations annual travel 
expenses. This figure also included the costs of higher fares, wasted employee time and 
additional hotel accommodation costs. 
Apart from the ethical matter of employees engaging in ‘mileage runs’ and unnecessary 
travel, Arnesen et al. (1997) also address the ethical issues which relate to the consequences 
of these actions to society as a whole. They argue that the rewards are attractive, addictive and 
in practice tax free. In most countries, the tax laws require an employee to pay tax for the 
miles privately accrued from business travel which has been paid for by the employer. But the 
system relies on self-reporting and the value of accrued miles cannot be determined until they 
are used since they will be valued differently depending on which reward the FFP member 
chooses. For instance, it is not clear if the value of a reward flight should be taxed at full or at 
discounted value since the reward flight would be at a discounted fare price (Hu et al. 1988). 
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Even though Hu et al. in their work pointed out that frequent flyer rewards in the U.S. may be 
treated as discounts and would therefore not be taxable, they concluded that it was completely 
irrelevant since the law is totally unenforceable. Since no customer loyalty programme points 
are reported, the risk of being caught for not declaring the value of them is virtually non-
existent. This fact was made rather clear as the U.S. tried to pass a bill which was designed to 
require airlines to report rewards for taxation purposes – it was abandoned due to the 
complexity of the accounting and evaluation of rewards (Deane 1988). And while the taxation 
of FFP points may be difficult enough to implement due to the existing format of the loyalty 
programmes, airlines are doing their part to complicate things further in order to protect their 
members and thereby the value of their FFPs. In 1993, when the Australian Tax Office 
declared that frequent flyer rewards were taxable, the domestic airlines immediately came up 
with elaborate schemes which allowed their members to avoid taxation. 
According to Arnesen et al. (1997) U.S. courts have despite of mentioned research results 
found that FFPs are not illegal since they “do not encourage employees to break their 
fiduciary duty to their employers, introduce tortuous interference with contractual relations, or 
constitute commercial bribery”. But as Arnesen et al.  point out, “legality is not a sufficient 
condition for ethicality”. They also conclude that FFPs do not satisfy the deontological 
requirement2 for being ethical due to the intentions of the airlines and this certainly becomes 
true if an employee engages in the practise of incurring unnecessary travel costs. Neither do 
they find FFPs to be ethical according to consequential utilitarianism3 since they are contrary 
to the agency relationship and also this becomes clear if the employee incurs additional costs 
due to unnecessary travel and thereby causes social costs and lost productivity. 
Some U.S. corporations, including Texaco, Boeing and Texas Instruments, have demanded 
that frequent flyer miles are used for business travel. But they are exceptions since a survey of 
313 corporations revealed that only 11% of companies believe that the FFP rewards of 
employees belong to them (Hu et al. 1988). One reason for this is claimed to be that airlines 
have refused to share information on their FFP members and their account records and it is 
concluded that airlines will fiercely resist any attempts from companies to make gain or use 
any FFP benefits accumulated by their employees. One important reason for this is said to be 
                                                 
2
 An act that satisfies the requirement of being generalisable and equal to all and also reversible so that one 
would be willing to be treated in a similar way.  
3
 An act is under utilitarianism ethical if it in the long run has a bigger positive effect on social welfare than its 
consequences. 
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that corporate travel managers would coordinate the benefits and make good use of them and 
thereby significantly lower the breakage. Hu et al. remark that this is handled much 
differently by European and Japanese airline carriers who instead have created corporate 
frequent flyer programmes. Historically, companies have not been able to participate in FFPs 
and only individuals could join. This has however changed and many airlines now offer FFPs 
also to companies, among the examples PartnerPlusBenefit from the Lufthansa Group, On 
Business from British Airways and SAS Credits from SAS can be mentioned. But many 
companies still don’t participate due to the administrational burden of participation and prefer 
to give their travelling employees the perk of airline miles as an additional appreciation which 
does not affect their balance sheet. 
Many U.S. companies, including Citicorp and AT&T, state in their corporate policies that any 
travel mileage accrued on company travel belongs to the employee. However, the corporate 
policy of AT&T also provides restrictions and prohibits employees from significantly 
changing their itinerary to gain more FFP points (Deane 1988). Some employers, such as 
Brazier Forest, believe that this practise is a simple fringe benefit to compensate employees 
for being away from home. Arnesen et al. (1997) therefore believe that every organisation 
should have a policy which clarifies how frequent flyer awards should be managed. It is 
however clear that very few companies attempt to claim the FFP points which their 
employees earn on business trips. One reason for this is according to Deane (1988) that it 
risks putting an unnecessary schism between travelling employees and their employer. 
Unfortunately, the ethical matters on FFPs aren’t that easy to settle. While it is easy to 
understand the argument that an occasional free flight is a harmless fringe benefit for 
employees who have to travel much and stay away from home, it may of course also be 
argued that many managers who take this decision are most likely to also benefit from this 
perk themselves. And the survey of Arnesen et al. (1997) also highlights that several 
corporate travel officers reported that the most severe abuse of FFPs was conducted by their 
high-level executives. This further strengthens the case for clear but stringent travel policies 
such as the ones which AT&T has in place, because: ”Ethical views in organisations start at 
the top. Under such hypothesis, employees accept a practise as ethically sound if it is 
condoned and supported by top management” (Deane 1988). Conclusions on the ethics of 
FFPs are widely scattered and most likely also strongly influenced by the personal opinion of 
the author/s. Hu et al. (1988) conclude that they are of the opinion that airlines should 
continue their successful practise of keeping FFP rewards from the companies who pay for 
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the business travel and do what they can to let the individual traveller keep it. They consider it 
to be an affordable and charitable way of compensating business travellers for flight delays, 
poor meals, lost baggage while having to be away from home. On the other end of the 
spectrum lies the short and clear statement of Whyte (2004) who in his conclusion remarks 
that “the schemes create spurious loyalty and are a form of commercial bribery”. 
2.4 The typical FFP member 
A survey conducted by Whyte (2004) determines the profile of a typical corporate frequent 
flyer to be male (75%), middle-aged and a senior executive, manager or professionally 
employed. A majority of FFP members have been members for over 5 years and they 
predominantly book full economy class for domestic travel but there is a noticeable shift 
towards business class for international travel. Since Whyte’s survey was conducted in 
Australia, it is worth noting that international travel in his survey, for most cases compares to 
intercontinental travel for a European traveller. 
While the reasons for targeting frequent business travellers may seem self-explanatory, the 
work of Martín et al. (2011) confirms that FFP members have a higher willingness to pay 
higher ticket prices than non-FFP members, but also that there is a big variation depending on 
who pays for the ticket. Not surprisingly, FFP members who don’t pay for their tickets 
themselves, essentially business travellers, are much less price-sensitive and willing to pay for 
additional services (including airline miles). 
Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1999) determined that business travellers are willing to pay a 
premium of 21 USD to travel with an airline where they hold a membership with its FFP and 
this premium ranges as high as 52 USD for low-frequency travellers and 72 USD for high-
frequency travellers. The premium which leisure travellers are willing to pay is notably lower 
at 7 USD and ‘only’ ranges as high as 18 USD for low-frequency travellers and 26 USD for 
high-frequency travellers. This result clearly explains why airlines aim to mainly target their 
FFPs towards business travellers and how strongly an active participation in an FFP can raise 
an airline's revenue. 
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3 Switching costs and price discrimination in theory 
3.1 Switching costs 
Due to the nature of the FFP’s rewards, most switching costs faced by an FFP member are 
financial switching costs and relational switching costs according to the classification of 
Burnham et al. (2003). While relational switching costs may be of significance, we here focus 
on the financial impact on the decision making process since this is the main component of 
the FFPs. According to Holm, (2000), if a business traveller receives the utility  from 
travelling with airline A and the utility  from travelling with airline B, he will choose to 
travel with airline A if  >  regardless of price if his employer pays and he himself feels 
no obligation to save his employer money. And if a FFP increases the utility of the traveller 
with α, he will chose to travel with airline A if  + α > . The natural consequence which 
follows is of course that airline A can increase its price and charge more than airline B, for the 
same product, while still winning the business. FFPs increase switching costs since customers 
perceive competitors prices to be higher due to missing out on discounts or rewards from the 
accrual of miles as pointed out by Terblanche (2014). By comparing prices and switching 
costs for seven domestic airlines in Sweden, Carlsson and Löfgren (2006) showed that the 
FFP of SAS, Eurobonus, increased the switching costs with 12% of the average ticket price. 
But the case with FFPs is even more complex than that since the switching costs are non-
linear and instead progressive as both Klemperer (1995) and Carlsson and Löfgren explain. 
The main reason for this is because when a traveller already has accrued some points with the 
FFP of a certain airline, additional points will be more valuable to him since they will bring 
him closer to the level required to claim a reward trip. But another reason is that FFPs have 
divided their members into status levels depending on the level of business the traveller has 
awarded them with in the past. And these status levels offer further rewards such as additional 
points or lounge access, hence tying the FFP members closer and more strongly to them. 
Considering Klemperer’s two-period model, and expanding it to n periods and adding  for 
the additional utility offered by the FFP of airline A in period p, we get: 
 +  > , where  < ⋯ <  ≤ ⋯ ≤ , for  ∈ ℕ. (1) 
The above equation gives the decision criteria at period p and states that airline A can charge 
more for its product for each period p which goes by. There is however a practical limit since 
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the growth of  declines with each period as the FFP member eventually stagnates at a 
certain travel level which may be considered an asymptote of the combined growth of utility 
over time. Still, it is clear that the artificially introduced switching costs reduces the 
competitive ability of airline A’s competitors. 
If the business traveller is completely loyal to his employer, he will choose to travel with 
airline A if  −  >  − , where  is the price of airline X. But with company A 
offering a FFP, his decision criteria becomes: 
 +  −  >  − . (2) 
The additional utility, for his personal benefit, gives him a strong incentive to choose airline A 
even if it is not the alternative which optimises the benefit to his employer who pays for the 
trip. For clarity, it is pointed out that it is not necessarily the lowest cost alternative which 
optimises the benefit to the employer since it may include an unnecessary layover and cause a 
waste of employee resources. This very clearly illustrates the principal-agent-problem and 
how the agent (employee) may be corrupted by the FFP to act against the best interest of the 
principal (employer). If the traveller is travelling privately and himself paying for the ticket, 
the above decision criteria ceases to be a moral hazard but will still affect his decision making 
in favour of airline A. And since he may have accumulated points from previous business 
travel, his business travel may have a strong affect on his choice of aircarrier also when 
travelling privately. Additionally, the higher the switching costs are, the less the search for an 
alternative provider is likely to pay off since a new alternative must not only pay for the cost 
in time to be found but also offer a price , where  and  combined need to be lower 
than , thus further lowering the competitiveness of the market place. 
Regardless of who is paying for the airline ticket, the switching costs of airline A may be 
fought by other airlines also introducing a FFP of their own, just as most large aircarriers have 
done. But as the equations show, the later the period in which a new provider enters the game, 
the higher the switching costs have become and thereby constitute a significant entry barrier 
which deters new entrants and lowers competition. Because of these switching costs, a firm’s 
current market share is important for its future revenue when customers are tied to the 
provider (Klemperer, 1995). This is expected to lead to stronger competition with larger 
discounts (more points) being offered in early periods when more carriers compete, but lead 
to lower competition and higher prices in later periods when a few number of carriers become 
and remain profitable while others give up the route. This reasoning, supported by expression 
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(2) above, provides the theoretical background of Hypothesis 1 and why airlines are expected 
to offer higher percent discounts when facing competition.
3.2 Price discrimination
Some customers being willing to pay more for higher quality and more value is easy to 
understand, but the mechanisms behind the decisions and how to maximise the revenue from 
higher quality requires more analysis. This is easiest visualised by considering inverse 
demand curves    − 
quality product and   2 for 
quantity,  is the quality level of product 
to be negative, it follows that 
demand curve rotates and increase
market size also grows, but the air travel market can in this respect be considered a monopoly 
in the short term due to fixed 
slots (highly regulated airline ‘timetables’). So the increase in quality rotates the inverse 
demand curve from ,  
Graph 1: The pivoting of inverse demand curves when quality increases
Now, the reservation price of the Qth 
paying P2 and receiving quality 
 
 
 
 
 as suggested by Pepall et al. (2004), with 
a lower quality product and where  is the 
i and k is a constant. Since prices are not expected 
 . By increasing the quality level from 
s the customers’ reservation prices. In some cases the 
quantities because of seating configurations and allocation of 
to ,  as shown in Graph 1. 
customer will mean that he is indifferent between 
z2 or paying P1 and receiving quality z1, 
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  1 for a high 
price,  is the 
 to , the inverse 
 
 
thereby raising his 
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reservation price. It also gives less price sensitive customers, who place high value on quality 
and are located to the left of curve compared to the Qth customer, an appealing offer which 
also earns the supplier more revenue. Depending on the desired price and quality level which 
maximise profits, companies which offer two quality level products, such as airlines, will 
often choose to select a quantity Q1, and quality z1, which ensures that  ! remains 
above a certain level and separates price sensitive customers from price insensitive customers. 
This is known as vertical product differentiation and allows the supplier to distinguish high 
profit customers from low profit customers. 
The indirect utility a customer of type i, receives is   "# − $ − ,   1, 2, where θi 
is a measure of how much value the customer places on quality and zi is the lower bound of 
quality where the customer still buys. Additionally, " > ",     0 and naturally 
  0 for the customer to buy at all. A customer of type 2 will buy the lower quality product 
if   ", but a customer of type 1 will only buy the high quality product if he receives a 
non-negative indirect utility and if "# − $ −   "# − $ − . Substituting  with 
", we see that 
 ≤ " − " − "  (3) 
is the highest price the supplier can charge for the high quality product. As can be seen, the 
price which can be charged for the higher quality product becomes higher the more value the 
customers place on quality. It should be noted that also the value which type 2 customers 
place on value has a positive effect on the price for the higher quality product. It can also be 
seen that the larger the difference between the product qualities z1 and z2 is, the higher price 
can be charged for the high quality product.  
This important result, that larger quality differences lead to the ability to charge higher prices 
for the higher quality product, explains the big product difference in the airline industry. 
One very well known way in which airlines differentiate their product is through selling 
tickets in different classes, most commonly economy class which is a lower quality product 
and business class which is a higher quality product. Business class tickets don’t only offer 
better seats and meals, but also additional conveniences such as lounge access and higher 
baggage allowances. Another way to offer business passengers more value and further 
increase the price of their tickets and strengthen the price discrimination is by offering them 
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more points or a higher value of their points. This provides theoretical support for Hypothesis 
2 and why it is expected that airlines offer business travellers more value for their points. 
It is well understood that there is a finite number of seats and thereby tickets which are 
offered for the different classes on any certain route and day. And it is also well known that 
the price differences between economy and business class tickets are very big, often several 
factors, and with practically stable prices for business class tickets. This creates two very 
distinct and separate customer groups and leads to the inverse demand curves for air travel to 
be assumed to look like in Graph 2. 
Pbusiness(Q,zbusiness)
Peconomy(Q,zeconomy)
Price
Quantity
Peconomy(max)
Pbusiness
Peconomy(min)
QeconomyQbusiness
 
Graph 2: The assumed inverse demand curve for airline travellers 
As can be seen in Graph 2, there is a certain minimum price which needs to be paid for a seat 
in economy class and a certain minimum price which needs to be paid in business class. Most 
travellers will be located between Qeconomy and Qbusiness and buy an economy class ticket. 
Those travellers who are located to the right of Qeconomy will think that air travel is too 
expensive and choose an alternative travel method such as train. But the left-most travellers in 
Graph 2, who belong to a rather exclusive group which is less price sensitive, will become 
more inclined to purchase business class tickets since it will increase their indirect utility 
according to their personal preferences. 
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4 Variables and collected data 
Five  large FFPs, which customer benefits are analysed, were selected for the research in this 
paper. The FFPs, the airlines they serve as FFP for, and the airline alliance they belong to are 
shown in Table 3. 
Frequent flyer programme Airlines served Airline alliance 
Executive Club British Airways (BA) Oneworld 
Eurobonus Scandinavian Airlines (SAS) Star Alliance 
Flying Blue Air France (AF), KLM, Air Europa, Kenya Airways, TAROM SkyTeam 
Miles & More 
Lufthansa (LH), Austrian Airlines, LOT Polish Airlines, 
Swiss International Air Lines, Adria Airways, Croatia 
Airlines, Condor Flugdienst, Luxair, Brussels Airlines, 
Germanwings 
Star Alliance 
Topbonus Air Berlin (AB), Niki Oneworld 
Table 3: Overview of frequent flyer programmes, the airlines they serve, and airline alliance 
Each of these 5 FFPs have four different status levels which members can strive to obtain by 
collecting enough points within a given amount of time, usually a year. Apart from giving 
access to certain service rewards, such as lounge access, higher status levels often give an 
additional amount of points as bonus on flight travel. An overview of these status levels and 
the amount of bonus points they offer on flight travel can be seen in Table 4. 
 Executive Club Eurobonus Flying Blue Miles & More Topbonus 
Lowest status level 
points bonus 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
1st status level points 
bonus Ca. 15-25% 0% 50% 25% 20% 
2nd status level points 
bonus 
Ca. 60-100% 
Same as 3rd level 
25% 75% 25% 40% 
3rd and highest status 
level points bonus 
Ca. 60-100% 
Same as 2nd level 25% 100% 25% 40% 
Table 4: Overview of status levels and the amount of bonus points they offer 
To calculate the value of the points received, and the level of discount they present, 13 
European and more distant locations were selected to represent flights of different distances. 
These locations can be found in Appendix A. The main hub of the main airline served is for 
each of the 5 FFPs included among the European locations and serves as the home location 
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for each simulated frequent flyer. This means that the frequent flyer using Executive Club, 
which serves British Airways, has London as his home location and that the frequent flyer 
using Miles & More, which mainly serves Lufthansa, has Frankfurt as his home location. In 
the same way, the home location of the frequent flyer using Eurobonus is Copenhagen, the 
home location of the frequent flyer using Flying Blue is Paris, and the home location of the 
frequent flyer using Topbonus is Berlin. Since someone travelling from London with relative 
ease can use any of greater London’s 6 international airports, the home location is not 
identified as an airport but as a city, and a traveller may use any of the airports in the city’s 
greater area. Only direct flights were considered, which meant that in some cases flights 
between selected locations had to be substituted with flights between other locations of 
similar distance in order to not lose observations when no direct flights between the original 
locations were available. A list of such substituted routes may also be found in Appendix A. 
Data has then been collected online for return flights from the home city of each of the 
frequent travellers, to each of the other locations, buying a ticket from the main airline which 
their FFP serves. Prices for tickets bought 1 or 14 weeks in advance, in business class or 
lowest economy (including any costs for 1 checked-in piece of luggage), and for the travel 
days of Monday-Friday were used, thereby simulating a businessman who is gone for 
business during an entire working week. When a ticket was sold out, the price of the same 
type of ticket 1-3 weeks earlier or later was used instead, and the variable “Weeks” was 
changed from 1 or 14 to reflect the true number of weeks before departure that the ticket price 
was obtained. Ticket prices where all obtained between Friday and Sunday on the weeks 10-
13 during March 2015, and for British Airways tickets, the exchange rate of 1:1.37 between 
EUR/GBP was used4. 
For each flight, the ticket price, with fees and taxes added separately, was used to calculate 
the value of the frequent flyer points received. For instance, a SAS lowest economy return 
flight between Copenhagen and Oslo which is bought 14 weeks in advance costs the traveller 
80.00 + 66.12 = 146.12 EUR. As a Eurobonus member, he will earn 500 or 630 points for this 
return flight depending on his FFP status according to Table 4. Since the same flight would 
cost him 20,000 points and 36.08 EUR in fees and taxes if booked as an award flight, the 
value of his earned points can be calculated to be 2.75 EUR or 3.47 EUR or a Percent 
discount of 1.9% or 2.4%, again depending on his FFP status with Eurobonus. After 
                                                 
4
 www.xe.com, 2015.03.27 
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collectionof the data of the flights and routes, multiple regression using OLS will be used to 
clarify which variables significantly affect the value of the points obtained, and the ticket 
discount in percent, and if they support the hypotheses stated in the introductory part of this 
paper. The data which was collected for the regressions on the value of the points obtained, 
and on the discount, is shown in Table 5. 
 Value Percent Discount Weeks 
Competitor
s 
Class Distance Status level 
Definition 
Value in 
EUR of the 
points 
received 
for a flight 
Value/Paid 
price 
Number of 
weeks in 
advance of 
flight, the 
ticket price 
was offered 
Number of 
competing 
carriers 
serving the 
same route 
1 if 
Business 
or 0 if 
lowest 
economy 
Distance 
between 
locations 
in km 
Between 0-
3, 
depending 
on status 
level in 
Table 4 
Min 
value 0.6 0.3 0 0 0 293 0 
Max. 
Value 2142 46.5 14 5 1 9760 3 
Average 132.5 8.3 6.2 2.0 0.5 2696 1.5 
Std. Dev. 221.8 6.5 6.4 1.28 0.5 N/A N/A 
Table 5: Overview of the variables on which data was collected 
For most award flights, the frequent traveller still needs to pay for the fees and taxes and only 
receives the airlines ticket price for free. But with Air Berlin and Lufthansa, it is on many 
European routes also possible to pay for the fees and taxes with additional points. When this 
has been the case, the values of both options have been calculated and the option which gives 
the most value to the traveller has been chosen.  
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5 Results 
5.1 Investigation of Hypothesis 1 
Having collected the data described in Chapter 4, we regress Percent Discount on Weeks, 
Competitors, Class, Distance and Status to see how much Competitors affect the percent 
discount compared to other relevant variables. The results are given in the regression table in 
Table 6. The values are the independent variable coefficients for predicting Percent Discount 
and the values in parenthesis are the p-values. The p-values are noted with * if significant at 
the 95% level, with ** if significant at the 99% level and *** if significant at the 99.9% level. 
 Regr. 1 Regr. 2 Regr. 3 Regr. 4 Regr. 5 Regr. 6 
Intercept -0.18 (0.6832) 
7.49         
(1E-73)*** 
6.74         
(2E-106)*** 
5.84         
(2E-95)*** 
6.23         
(2E-94)*** 
-6E-3 
(0.9886) 
Weeks 0.02  (0.3081) - - - - - 
Comp. 1.07         (3E-19)*** 
0.35 
(0.0219)* - - - 
1.07         
(3E-19)*** 
Class 2.78         (1E-20)*** - 
2.98         
(3E-14)*** - - 
2.78         
(1E-20)*** 
Distance 1E
-3
         
(3E-71)*** - - 
9E-4         
(2E-39)*** - 
1E-3         
(3E-71)*** 
Status 1.25         (8E-21)*** - - - 
1.25         
(2E-16)*** 
1.25         
(8E-21)*** 
Adj. R2 26.9% 0.4% 5.2% 14.6% 4.3% 26.9% 
Observ. 1520 1063 1063 1063 1520 1520 
Table 6: Regression table of regressions for Percent Discount 
As can be seen in the column of Regression 1, the coefficient values for all independent 
variables are significant, with the exception for Weeks which does not have any predictive 
significance and should be omitted. In order to make sure that the regression result is robust, 
we also regress Percent Discount on the remaining independent variables on their own and 
check that their p-values are still significant. The reason for losing some observations when 
regressing on Competitors, Class and Distance is because a number of duplicate observations 
are omitted when Status is not included in a regression. The duplicate observations is a result 
of not all FFPs offering different amounts of bonus points for their different status levels as 
shown in Table 4. Since all remaining independent variables also have significant p-values 
when regressed on individually, they are considered robust enough to be included in the 
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prediction of Percent Discount and the result is Regression 6 in Table 6. One may be surprised 
by the low coefficient of Distance and believe that it does not affect the prediction of Percent 
Discount very much. But this would be a big error since it is actually Distance which is the 
variable that has the greatest effect on the prediction of Percent Discount as can be seen when 
comparing the coefficients of determination for the independent variables. On its own, it 
explains 14.6% of the percent of the discount offered to passengers by the FFP points they 
receive. Despite its low coefficient, it greatly affects Percent Discount since the distances 
flown are usually great. From Regression 6 we see that for every 1,000 km of a flight’s 
distance, an FFP member may expect to receive 1 additional unit percent of discount. 
Additionally, he can expect to receive an additional 1.25 unit percent of discount for every 
status level he has advanced and another 2.78 unit percent of discount if he flies business class 
instead of lowest economy. And for every competing carrier on the route, he may also expect 
an additional 1.07 unit percent of discount which supports Hypothesis 1 and that airlines 
increase the percent discount of the value of the points they offer their passengers in the 
presence of competition. Together, the variables Competitors, Class, Distance and Status 
explain 26.9% of the Percent discount of the points awarded to FFP members. 
While the results from Table 6 seem convincing in supporting Hypothesis 1, it is still possible 
that the airlines react differently to competition since Table 6 gives a prediction of what to 
expect from all of them collectively. To see if any airlines act differently under the influence 
of competition, we create 4 dummy variables called “If EB”, “If FB”, “If MM” and “If TB” 
which take the values of 1 if a flight is carried out by the airline mainly served by Eurobonus, 
Flying Blue, Miles & More or Topbonus respectively, or 0 otherwise. Flights carried out by 
the airline mainly served by Executive Club is the base case and we create 4 new interaction 
terms where the variable Competitors is multiplied with the 4 new dummy variables.  
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 Regr. 7 
Intercept 1.49             (4E-5)*** 
Comp. 1.69             (1E-46)*** 
Comp. x If EB -3.04            (4E-59)*** 
Comp. x If FB -1.88            (2E-43)*** 
Comp. x If MM -3.3              (1E-58)*** 
Comp. x If TB 0.41  (0.0095)** 
Class 2.78             (1E-28)*** 
Distance 1E
-3
             
(6E-87)*** 
Status 1.25             (7E-29)*** 
Adj. R2 49.2% 
Observ. 1520 
Table 7: Regression with interaction variables for Percent Discount  
The regression output is seen in Table 7, and apart from the base case it also gives the terms 
for the coefficients of the other 4 cases to be added to the base case. Adding these terms, we 
get the individual regression coefficients for the FFPs’ Percent Discount in Table 8. This 
regression also strongly increases the coefficient of determination to 49.2%. 
 Executive Club Eurobonus Flying Blue Miles & More Topbonus 
Comp. 1.69             (1E-46)*** -1.35 -.19 -1.61 2.1 
Table 8: Individual coefficients for the FFPs for regression on Percent Discount 
As seen in Table 8, the different airlines manage competition in different ways. As expected, 
Executive Club and Topbonus give an FFP member 1.69 and 2.78 unit percent higher 
discount respectively, for every competing carrier which is trafficking the same route. But 
Eurobonus, Flying Blue and Miles & More work in the opposite direction and give their FFP 
members a lower percent discount for each competing carrier they face on the same routes. So 
while the market as a whole supports Hypothesis 1, three out of five airlines still offer lower 
discounts when facing increased competition. 
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5.2 Investigation of Hypothesis 2 
To investigate Hypothesis 2, Value is regressed on Weeks, Competitors, Class, Distance and 
Status and the regression table in Table 9 is obtained. Just as when regressing Percent 
Discount, Weeks does not play a significant role and is omitted as a variable. When regressing 
Value on the remaining variables individually to check for robustness, it reveals that also 
Competitors should be omitted. The negative coefficient of determination  may cause 
confusion, but is a valid output since it is the adjusted coefficient of determination. It being 
negative in this case means that the prediction is worse than the prediction offered by the 
mean value. 
 Regr. 8 Regr. 9 Regr. 10 Regr. 11 Regr. 12 Regr. 13 
Intercept -154.09   (8E-30)*** 
128.16     
(5E-22)*** 
71.921     
(2E-14)*** 
1.1111 
(0.8798) 
100.23     
(2E-23)*** 
-93.309   
(1E-21)*** 
Weeks -0.3033 (0.6552) - - - - - 
Comp. 27.913     (2E-15)*** 
1.8019 
(0.7305) - - - - 
Class 121.07     (1E-41)*** - 
120.01     
(2E-19)*** - - 
120.99     
(3E-40)*** 
Distance 0.0545     (2E-181)*** - - 
0.0507     
(3E-114)*** - 
0.0518     
(4E-168)*** 
Status 20.487     (1E-7)*** - - - 
20.531 
(0.0001)*** 
20.531     
(2E-7)*** 
Adj. R2 46.4% -0.08% 7.31% 38.5% 0.9% 44.2% 
Observ. 1520 1063 1063 1063 1520 1520 
Table 9: Regression table of regressions for Value 
The remaining 3 variables are significant and the prediction of Value is the result from 
Regression 13 in Table 9. The prediction of Value tells us that a business man who chooses to 
travel business class may expect to receive points which are worth 121 EUR per flight more 
compared to if he chooses to fly lowest economy. For each flight, he will also receive points 
for an additional value of 20.5 EUR for each status level he has reached within his FFP. But 
the dominant predictor of the Value of the points a FFP member receives is the distance of his 
flight and he will earn points of a value of over 5 cents for each km he travels. These three 
variables together explain 44.2% of the value a traveller earns from his collected points. 
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Considering how Hypothesis 2 states that airlines wish to offer price insensitive customers 
more value in order to encourage them to purchase more expensive high quality products, one 
has to ask if the price the customer pays may be a good variable for predicting the value he 
receives. The price paid has purposely been excluded since it was expected to correlate with 
many of the other variables and cause problems with multicollinearity. But in Regression 13 
only two price correlated variables remain, Class and Distance. Passengers have to pay more 
for travelling in business class or longer distances, but their status level depends only on 
previous purchases. So for this reason, Value is again regressed, but this time on Price Paid 
and Status and the results are presented in Table 10. 
 Regr. 14 Regr. 15 
Intercept -70.968        (1E-37)*** 
-32.438        
(6E-13)*** 
Price Paid 0.1456     (0)*** 
0.1376     
(0)*** 
Status 20.531          (2E-15)*** - 
Adj. R2 76.5% 75.3% 
Observations 1520 1065 
Table 10: Value regressed on Price Paid and Status 
Maybe not so surprising, the best prediction variable to determine the value of the points a 
frequent flyer receives is the amount of money he spends on his ticket. On its own, this 
variable explains 75.3% of the value of the points a passenger receives and in combination 
with his status level it explains 76.5% 
5.3 The cost of achieving status 
Apart from free travel rewards, FFPs offer other privileges including lounge access and 
increased baggage allowance depending on the member’s status level. And as presented in 
Table 4, a higher status level also leads to a higher earning rate of points and an increased 
value received. The status level of a frequent flyer is determined only from the points he earns 
from air travel. And since there is such a strong correlation between the value of the points he 
receives and the price he pays for a ticket, this has been used to calculate how much money he 
needs to spend to reach the different status levels of the different FFPs. These results have 
been gathered in Table 11. 
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Frequent flyer 
programme 
Annual travel cost 
to achieve status 
level 1 
Annual travel cost 
to achieve status 
level 2 
Annual travel cost 
to achieve status 
level 3 
Executive Club 8,968 EUR 17,935 EUR 44,838 EUR 
Eurobonus 3,783 EUR (or 10 flights) 
8,512 EUR 
(or 45 flights) 
17,025 EUR 
(or 90 flights) 
Flying Blue 
5,419 EUR 
(or 15 flights) 
10,837 EUR 
(or 30 flights) 
16,255 EUR 
(or 60 flights) 
Miles & More 8,428 EUR 24,080 EUR 
72,241 EUR 
(2 years in a row) 
Topbonus 
4,202 EUR 
(or 24 flights) 
8,404 EUR 
(or 60 flights) 16,808 EUR 
Table 11: Annual travel cost required to reach different status levels 
As seen in Table 11 it is also possible to achieve certain status levels with some FFPs by 
flying a certain number of flights per year. This is an additional possibility for frequent 
travellers who often travel short flights but do not earn many points due to the short distances 
and reluctance to pay for business class for the short journey to also achieve a higher status 
level. 
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6 Conclusion and discussion 
The level of the percent discount a frequent traveller gets on the points he receives mainly 
depend on the distance of his flight, the class he travels in and the status he has achieved with 
his FFP. The number of competing carriers on the route he travels also plays a significant 
role, but how is very much depending on his FFP and the main airline it serves. According to 
Hypothesis 1, it was expected that the traveller would receive a higher percent of discount the 
more competing carriers serving the same route. This was expected since theory shows that 
the introduction of switching costs skews competition and allows an airline with an FFP to 
charge higher prices due to having introduced switching costs. But the investigation shows 
that while this was to be expected in general, only Executive Club and Topbonus and their 
respective main airlines served, British Airways and Air Berlin, behave like this. The 
remaining 3 FFPs, Eurobonus, Flying Blue and Miles & More and their main airlines served, 
SAS, Air France and Lufthansa, instead offer a lower percent discount when facing 
competition. There may be a number of different reasons for this difference in behaviour. It 
could be that airlines on certain routes compete for larger groups of passengers who are not 
business travellers and thereby need to lower their prices to attract them since they are not 
members of the airlines’ FFPs and never will be. Being forced to compete by lower prices will 
then naturally lead to the airline having less margin to offer on discounts. With the strong 
growth of low-cost airlines in Europe, it is possible that such competitors are able to offer 
prices which are so much lower that it cancels many of the effects which switching costs 
have. It may also be that airlines choose to combat competition differently depending on route 
and type of competing carriers and that the observed differences are a result of the different 
routes being compared. Another possibility may be corporate or airline alliance policies since 
both British Airways and Air Berlin belong to the same airline alliance, Oneworld. 
Also the value of the points which a frequent flyer receives depend s mainly on the distance of 
his flight, the class he travels in and the status he has achieved. Even though the distance of a 
flight has the strongest effect on the value of the points earned from a flight, both the 
coefficients for Class and Status are positive and will help FFP members to receive even more 
value for choosing to travel in business class or having chosen more expensive travel in the 
past. So this supports Hypothesis 2 and that airlines can support price discrimination by 
offering business travellers more value for their travel choice through their FFP. The link 
between additional value received and higher priced products became even clearer when 
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regressing Value directly on Price Paid which alone explains over 75% of the value of the 
points a FFP member receives. And this in turn even stronger supports Hypothesis 2. 
Regardless of how the status levels have been reached, it is however clear that they present 
significant switching costs as well as added value to passengers who achieve them. If 
changing airline, the amounts in Table 11 reveal how much a traveller has to spend within a 
year to again be able to enjoy the added value provided by these status levels. And in the 
meanwhile he will have to do without them which constitutes a significant switching cost. 
These amounts also very strongly support Hypothesis 2 since it is clear that the status levels 
offer significant additional value and also require travel on a business level to be achieved. 
In conclusion, Hypothesis 1 has only partially been confirmed since only two airlines and 
their FFPs offer higher percent discounts when facing increased competition. These two 
airlines and their FFPs are however dominant enough to provide this as a general and 
significant result for the entire part of the investigated market. The remaining three airlines 
and their FFPs instead offer lower percent discounts in the presence of tougher competition. 
To more accurately explain these differences, more research and more detailed analysis would 
be required. Hypothesis 2 is considered to have been confirmed since there is a very strong 
connection the price a passengers pays and the value of the points he receives. It is therefore 
concluded that airlines use their FFPs to support price discrimination. 
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Appendix A – List of locations and substituted routes 
European cities Distant cities 
Amsterdam Beijing 
Berlin Chicago 
Copenhagen Dubai 
Frankfurt Istanbul 
Helsinki Moscow 
Lisbon New Delhi 
London New York 
Madrid Shanghai 
Munich Tokyo 
Oslo  
Paris  
Rome  
Zürich  
Table 12 List of locations  
Substituted route Alternative route used 
PAR-HEL-PAR PAR-ARN-PAR 
TXL-OSL-TXL TXL-ARN-TXL 
TXL-IST-TXL TXL-AYT-TXL 
TXL-TOK-TXL TXL-TLV-TXL 
TXL-DBX-TXL TXL-AUH-TXL 
TXL-LIS-TXL TXL-MAL-TXL 
TXL-AMS-TXL TXL-DUS-TXL 
CPH-IST-CPH CPH-ATH-IST 
CPH-DBX-CPH CPH-TLV-CPH 
CPH-MAD-CPH CPH-PMI-CPH 
CPH-LIS-CPH CPH-MIL-CPH 
Table 13 List of substituted and alternative routes 
